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How do we come to have moral knowledge? Is our discovery of moral facts more like our 
discovery of logical facts or empirical facts? I defend the contentious view that at least some of 
our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. In at least some cases, we can literally see that 
things are right or wrong. There are two steps to this project. First I show that it is possible to 
have moral perception. Moral perception occurs when someone perceives that an act is wrong, 
a person is good, etc. To show that moral perception is possible, I argue that putative cases of 
moral perception meet all of the necessary requirements on perception more generally. For 
example, I argue that it is possible for a subject to have a mental state that represents a moral 
property and that we can be in the appropriate causal relation with moral facts. The second step 
of the project is to show that moral perception is enough to generate knowledge. I show that 
moral perception is sufficient for moral knowledge on a number of contemporary accounts of the 
epistemology of perception. I also show that certain problems for knowledge, such as the 
problem of disagreement, do not pose a serious threat to moral knowledge given the possibility 
of moral perception. 
